Which possibilities become real?
An atlas of the possible cannot be a complete list. It can be a record of constraints, openings and paths.
The 'universe of possible things' has no useful single boundary unless we specify what may vary, what counts as a thing and which kind of possibility we mean.
Before the map, a definition
Suppose we asked for an atlas containing every possible object, organism, person, culture, institution, technology, feeling and word. The ambition is attractive precisely because it exceeds any familiar catalogue. But the demand hides several questions. What distinguishes one object from another? If the color changes, is it a new possibility? If a culture changes over a century, is it still one culture? Which physical laws are held fixed? Can a social practice that nobody has imagined belong to the map?
A map needs a scale and criteria of identity. There is no meaningful count of 'all possible things' until those have been chosen. We should not confuse an inventory of named categories with the space of possible configurations, or mistake the combinatorial count of configurations for a count of meaningful kinds. A database that adds more labels may cover more vocabulary without getting closer to the possible.
The problem is not an argument for giving up. It invites multiple partial maps that expose their own assumptions. A map of possible mechanisms differs from a map of objects worth building, a map of cultural roles or a map of concepts for which people may eventually demand words.
Possible, feasible, viable, adopted, named
Begin by distinguishing five transitions. A configuration may be describable under a chosen set of rules. It may be physically feasible under real constraints. It may be constructible using particular materials, energy sources and skills. It may survive and reproduce long enough to become common. And it may gain the attention, utility or symbolism necessary to become an established cultural category. Naming is an additional process, not the last mandatory step.
These sets are not a neat nested staircase. An unattainable imaginary creature can be named and drawn for centuries. A useful physical mechanism can remain unnoticed. A common experience may have several unstable expressions rather than one accepted word. The transitions are different processes, often with feedback: names influence adoption; standards make inventions buildable; new instruments make phenomena observable.
We can ask why one candidate spreads without claiming that its spread was inevitable. Economic incentives can favor it in one institutional setting and block it in another. A stable mechanism can be undesirable; an unstable arrangement can be continually rebuilt; a costly practice can persist because it marks identity or status. Human values do not reduce to one utility score.
Forces, but not one equation of destiny
Energy availability and thermodynamics constrain physical processes. Those constraints matter enormously, but entropy is not a general-purpose force that tells us which product, institution or word must appear next. Evolution by variation and differential persistence can help explain biological forms and some cultural change, but the analogy must not erase agency, teaching, institutions or the fact that people redesign their environments and selection pressures.
Mechanisms define what can produce what. Stability and repair determine duration. Resources and infrastructure influence accessibility. Desires and practical value influence adoption. Conflict, law and power determine who is permitted to make a possibility real. Contingency, timing and historical inheritance can close off otherwise feasible paths. Art, fashion and play create categories for reasons that are neither survival optimization nor profit.
The forces are not independent sliders. Electricity distribution can change domestic architecture; domestic architecture changes habits; habits create words; words create markets; markets finance new materials. A model that pretends to predict each dimension independently could produce coherent-looking but impossible combinations.
A worked fork: the crease
Consider a mark at the fold of a phone screen. In one future, foldable screens become commonplace and the mark becomes an ordinary wear category, standardized by repairers and insurers. A specialized tool is sold to record it. In another future, the same failure becomes negligible because materials and hinge designs improve. In a third, users deliberately value the visible fold as evidence of age and ownership. In a fourth, the whole device category is displaced before the problem is standardized.
The present defect does not contain the instructions for choosing its future. To trace these possibilities responsibly we need conditional dependencies: material durability, unit prices, repair rights, user expectations, replacement cycles, design changes and competing device formats. Some relationships can be investigated empirically; others are interpretive or invented. The branches should be labelled as such, and none deserves a percentage merely for being pictured.
One can perform the same exercise with an emergent cultural practice or a new kind of scientific concept. But people and cultures must not be treated like prefabricated parts whose combinations yield a predictable human destiny. A culture is made and revised by people, under unequal historical conditions; the taxonomy itself can influence the people being classified.
An atlas that records what it cannot know
Imagine an atlas where one entry is not a future object but a possibility claim: 'portable, locally verifiable repair histories become a common accessory.' The entry links its prerequisites, competing designs, present analogues, opposing social interests, possible disconfirming evidence and an actual date for reassessment. It also links proposed future words for the practice while marking them as inventions, not attested language.
Other entries would map scientific phenomena that become measurable only after new instruments, or social distinctions that become visible after a change in institutions. Readers could inspect several paths to the same function and see that a path's success may foreclose another. Revisions and negative outcomes would remain on the record. This would be an atlas of investigated possibilities, not a claim to have enumerated the universe.
The Cabinet is a good place to start precisely because its objects are tangible enough to argue over. Future Objects asks: what might exist, and by which mechanisms? Future Words asks: what might people need to distinguish, and how might those distinctions enter language? The larger Possible Things inquiry connects the two without reducing them to one law.
Sources and points of contact
These references support particular background distinctions; they do not establish the speculative examples as actual inventions, predictions or experiments.
- David Tan, The Road Not Taken (2023) ↗
Why later success can make contested alternatives seem falsely obvious.
- On the origin of innovations: the opportunity vacuum (2017) ↗
A proposed framework for different filters governing innovation; interpreted here critically.
- Rudnicka et al., lexical gaps across languages (2023) ↗
Why lexical categories do not transparently duplicate the world.